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Czechoslovaki a had no t been at war with the Soviet Union . It s status , 
officially, was tha t of a liberate d alfy. In some way or othe r which I nevěr 
fully understoo d - as a result , perhaps , of th e great popularit y Beneš 
enjoyed in the Western countrie s -  th e impressio n got abou t in th e West 
tha t an independen t governmen t was being re-establishe d in tha t coun -
try. I t was an assumptio n for which I saw no evidenc e .. . What little we 
were able to learn , furthermore , abou t what was occurrin g in tha t par t 
of Czechoslova k territor y occupie d by Soviet forces mad e it eviden t 
tha t every device of infiltration , intimidation , and intrigu e was being 
brough t int o play with a view to laying th e groundwor k for establish-
men t of a Communis t monopol y of power in tha t countr y .. . 
George F . Kennan : M e m o i r s , vol. 2, 254f. (Bosto n 1967). 
O n Ma y 8, 1944, Czechoslovaki a an d th e Soviet U n i o n conclude d a t reat y o n th e 
relationshi p betwee n th e Czechoslova k governmen t an d th e Soviet commander - in -
chie f after th e Re d Army ' s entr y in t o Czechoslova k terr i tor y dur in g its l iberation . Th e 
treat y state d tha t after th e en d of immediat e militar y Operations , all p o w e r wou l d be 
in th e hand s of Czechoslova k authori t ies . I n particular , paragrap h N o . 7 of thi s t reat y 
state d tha t th e civilian popula t io n w o u l d be unde r Czechoslova k Jurisdiction , even in 
cases of crime s agains t Soviet soldiers . Howeve r , afte r th e Re d A r m y ' s arriva l in th e 
earl y sprin g of 1945, th e t reat y was n o t honore d an d its provision s were violated . 
At th e en d of militar y Operation s in Czechoslovakia , Soviet authorit ie s began a cam -
paign t o arres t an d depor t Czechos lova k civilians t o th e Soviet U n i o n . T h e region s 
mos t affected b y depor ta t ion s were Cent ra l an d Easter n Slovakia , an d Prague . Th e 
loca l authori t ie s did no t ignor e thes e event s an d repeatedl y requeste d a hal t t o suc h 
Operations . O n Jun e 5, 1945, Genera l Bohumi l Boček , Chie f of th e Genera l Staff of 
M y researc h on th e repatriatio n of Czechoslova k Citizen s from th e internmen t and prison 
camp s in the Soviet Unio n from 1945 to 1950 was mad e possible by a generou s grant from th e 
Centra l Europea n University , awarded in 1992 and 1993. Thi s articl e is an enlarged version 
of m y pápe r "The Deportatio n of Czechoslova k Citizen s to th e GULAG , 1945-1950", 
presente d at th e Conferenc e on Centra l and Easter n Europe , Universit y of Sout h Florida , 
Sarasota , Florida , on April 3, 1997. Th e first result s of m y researc h on thi s topi č were publi -
shed in my articl e "Pohlcen i stalinsko u mocí . Českoslovenšt í občan é deponovan í do inter -
načníc h tábor ů na územ í SSSR a československé ministerstv o zahranič í 1945-1950" [Czech -
oslovak Citizen s in th e Soviet internmen t and prison camp s and th e role of th e Czechoslova k 
Foreig n Ministry , 1945-1950] . Mezinárodn í politik a 11 (1991) 26f. 
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th e Czechoslova k Armed Force s informe d th e Czechoslova k Ministr y of Foreig n 
Affairs abou t th e arrest and deportatio n of Czechoslova k Citizen s by th e Red Army. 
Boček asked th e Foreig n Ministr y to také th e Steps to hal t th e arrest s and requeste d 
tha t th e treat y of Ma y 8, 1944 be respecte d by th e Red Army. Boček demande d tha t 
deporte d Czechoslova k Citizen s be returne d immediately 2. These protest s failed to 
generat e any positive response . 
Fro m th e beginning , th e Czechoslova k and Soviet position s in respec t to repatria -
tion of deporte d civilians were contradictory . Th e Czechoslovak s demande d tha t all 
of thei r deporte d Citizen s be unconditionall y returned . Th e Czechoslova k govern-
men t asked tha t th e Soviets submi t a list of individual s the y had detained , and concen -
trat e the m for repatriation . Czechoslova k diplomat s pushe d for th e adoptio n of thi s 
pian of action , but with little effect; th e Soviets refused to solve th e disput e in thi s 
manner . Th e Soviets require d th e Czechoslova k side to provide th e lists of th e 
name s and addresses of th e deporte d and interne d people . Onl y after these materials , 
includin g identificatio n numbers , name s and location s of camps , were provide d 
would the Soviets start negotiations 3. Soviet demand s led to an impasse for it was im-
possible to mee t these conditions . Ho w coul d th e family member s or th e Czechoslova k 
governmen t kno w th e identificatio n and th e locatio n of th e camp s in which th e deporte d 
person s were kept ? Durin g th e summe r and fall of 1945, as th e document s in th e 
Foreig n Ministry' s Archives in Pragu e demonstrate , th e family member s of th e inter -
nees were still tryin g to find ou t what happene d and where thei r fathers , brothers , and 
daughter s had disappeared . In cases where whole families were deported , or even 
whole villages, like Vyšný Blh in Slovakia, th e search for Czechoslova k Citizen s was 
even furthe r delayed . Often , peopl e did no t realize tha t thei r family member s or 
neighbour s had been deporte d to th e Soviet Union . Man y peopl e disappeare d withou t 
a trace . Overjoyed tha t th e war was over and anxiou s to assist thei r Slavic brothers , 
men volunteere d to help th e Soviet liberator s as Interpreters , to repai r thei r cars, or to 
reconstruc t damage d railroad s and highways. After the y finished thei r tasks, how-
ever, man y did no t retur n hom e and were deported . 
Th e inflexibility of th e Soviet negotiators , plus th e need to act forced th e Czechoslo -
vak governmen t int o meetin g unreasonabl e Soviet requirements . Startin g in th e middl e 
of 1946, th e Czechoslova k governmen t was able to develop quit e effective method s in 
thi s respect . At th e samé time , th e Czechoslova k diplomat s did no t abando n th e posi-
tion tha t it was a mora l dut y to interven e for every deporte d Czechoslova k citizen 
withou t exception , and continu e to deman d tha t th e Soviets had to unconditionall y re-
lease all Czechoslova k deporte d civilians. However , startin g from th e middl e of 1947, 
growing pressure by Communist s within th e Czechoslova k governmen t led to a com -
plete chang e in official attitude s towar d thi s problém , and to th e adoptio n of th e Soviet 
positio n requirin g selective repatriation . Th e goal of thi s articl e is to examin e th e peri -
peti a of th e struggle for th e repatriatio n of Czechoslova k Citizen s from GULA G 
(Gossudarstvenno e Upravleniy e Lageryami ; Stat e Administratio n of th e Camps ) and 
2 Archives of the Ministr y of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republi c (furthe r AMF A), U.S.S.R . 
1945-1959, box 37, folder4. 
3 Repor t of the Czechoslova k Embassy in Mosco w from Octobe r 15,1945. AMFA, U.S.S.R . 
1945-1959, box 37, folder 3. 
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to document the gradual incorporation of Czechoslovakia into the Soviet sphere of 
influence. 
Although the Soviets argued that it was impossible to register the Czechoslovak 
internees because they were dispersed all over the huge territory of the Soviet Union, 
my research indicates that the Soviet regime did not want to release the interned Czech-
oslovaks this way. An examination of documents on the administration of the 
NKVD (Narodnyi Kommissariat Vnutrennikh Del; People's Commissariat for Inter-
nal Affairs) camps4 suggests that Soviet Organs were actually able to compose the list 
of the Czechoslovak internees, and could have passed the data along in Czechoslova-
kia. GULAG records clearly show that in the camps, registration of internees by 
national groups was a routine. The Soviet authorities did have the records available, 
and it was pössible for them to submit the names of the people whom they had arrested 
and deported from Czechoslovakia. Moreover, the Czechoslovak deportees were not 
as widely dispersed as the Soviet diplomats claimed. For the most part, they were con-
centrated in a few camps in the Donbas area of the Ukraine, and in the Dzhaudzhikau 
and Nuzal camps in the Northern Osetiya. They also were in several places in the 
Vologodskaya oblast, in particular in the Cherepovets camps. My research indicates 
that it certainly would have been possible for the Soviets to organize the transfer of all 
deported Czechoslovaks back to their homeland. As the Czechoslovak Embassy in 
Moscow reported, both the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs ("MlD", Ministerstvo 
Innostrannykh Del) and the Governmental Repatriation Office refused to také any 
steps toward the repatriation of these Citizens, unless the Czechoslovak authorities 
submitted the current address of the persons to be repatriated5. 
The first indications of the locations of the camps and the names of people interned 
there appeared during 1946, when some of them happily returned and the first messa-
ges arrived. Until then, family members tried everything possible to find out where 
their relatives were. People wrote letters to institutions in Slovakia (mainly to the Pre-
sidium of the Slovák National Council), and in Prague (such as Red Cross, Presiden-
tial Chancellery, Ministry of Interior, and Ministry of Social Welfare) to search for 
their loved ones. This correspondence was forwarded to the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs which was in charge of the agenda of repatriation. Most of these letters were 
written by wives or by parents. The ages of the deportees ranged from sixteen- and 
seventeen-year old boys and girls to seventy-year old men. 
Due to Soviet intransigence, individual interventions were the only alternative left 
to repatriate those deported. The chance to be repatriated depended on whether the 
person was lucky enough to inform someone in Czechoslovakia about his or her 
location, and whether this information was submitted to the Ministry of Foreign 
4 I have examined particularly the record group "NKVD Administration of Prisoners of War 
and Internees" (UPVI NKVD SSSR: Upravleniye dlya voennoplennykh i internirovannykh 
Narodnogo komissariata vnutrennikh del SSSR) in the Center of Storage of the Historical and 
Documentary Collections (Tsentr khraneniya istoriko-dokumentalnykh kollektsiy) in Mos-
cow (former Central State Special Archives). I also researched in the Archives of the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, and in the Gossudarstvennyi Arkhiv Rossiiskoi 
Federatsii in Moscow. 
5 AMFA, U.S.S.R. 1945-1959, box 37, folder 3. 
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Affairs. As th e flow of request s for Intervent io n grew, loca l government s were in -
structe d h o w t o proceed . T h e dat a f ro m letter s of family member s o r loca l authori t ie s 
(mostl y loca l burgermeisters , loca l polic e station s o r professiona l circles , suc h as th e 
Associat io n of th e Slovák Rai l roa d Employees , an d th e Associatio n of th e Slovák Tea -
chers) , were summar ize d in th e lists an d t ransmit te d t h r o u g h th e Czechoslova k 
Embass y in M o s c o w in t o Soviet hands . T h e Soviet Embass y in Pragu e was ušed m u c h 
less frequentl y for t ransmit t in g th e informat ion . 
O n Marc h 26, 1946, th e Czechoslova k Ambassado r in M o s c o w , Jiř í H o r á k , saw th e 
Soviet Vice-Ministe r of Fore ig n Affairs Andre i Vyshinsky (th e no tor iou s chie f p ro -
secuto r of th e politica l trial s of th e 1930's) an d asked h i m t o interven e o n behal f of th e 
Czechos lova k internees . H o r á k ' s M e m o r a n d u m of Conversa t io n illustrate s th e 
hopelessnes s of th e Situation : 
I have negotiate d with Vyshinsky on Czechoslova k Citizen s interne d in the U.S.S.R . I stated 
tha t in thi s matter , we alread y had submitte d to th e Soviet Foreig n Ministr y thre e notes , a detail -
ed memorandu m and I intervene d seven time s orally in perso n and stressed th e problem s ou r 
Governmen t is dealin g with . Vyshinsky answered tha t accordin g to th e dat a of Soviet authori -
ties, ther e are onl y 513 person s left in th e Soviet Union , which is th e numbe r stated in th e Soviet 
not e from Januar y 30. Against his Statemen t I argued , tha t ou r Governmen t was receivin g contin -
uously new lists of interne d persons , and besough t th e Soviet Governmen t to solve th e whole 
Situatio n in a great-hearte d and high-principle d way. Thos e who are guilty will rende r an 
accoun t to th e Czechoslova k courts . Vyshinsky objecte d tha t it was almos t impossible to deter -
min e th e location s of th e person s dispersed in th e huge territor y of th e Soviet Union . I argued 
tha t accordin g to ou r informatio n ther e were in th e Stalin Works #  234-241 several hundre d of 
interne d Czechoslova k Citizens . Vyshinsky promise d thi s would be examine d and said we will 
be informed . To th e high-principle d way of th e Solution , he said tha t he would discuss th e 
questio n with othe r respective authorities . 
H o r á k conclude d hi s m e m o r a n d u m b y no t in g th e Soviet lack of Cooperatio n an d 
said , " I conside r thi s t o be on e of t h e t o p priorit ie s of th e Embassy , wh ic h will w o r k 
o n thi s p rob lé m wi th m a x i m u m effort " (translate d from Czec h b y th e au thor ) . 
I n 1946, all a t tempt s t o persuad e th e Soviet s r e tu r n th e depor te d Czechoslovak s o r 
at least t o submi t th e precis e lists of thei r names , failed. Therefore , th e Czechoslova k 
governmen t launche d a large campaig n of registratio n of all th e missin g Citizens . Ever y 
thre e m o n t h s , th e loca l polic e station s an d loca l government s ha d t o announc e all miss-
in g person s an d ha d t o submi t th e name s an d dat a of thos e w h o re tu rned . T h e form s 
were t o be re tu rne d periodicall y t o th e Fore ig n Minis t ry , whic h summar ize d t h e m an d 
t ransmit te d t h e m t o th e Soviet U n i o n . Thi s was th e onl y way t o brin g h o m e as m a n y 
of th e deportee s as possible . W i t h o u t thi s initiative , th e n u m b e r of thos e w h o were 
finally repatriate d wou l d have bee n m u c h smaller . I t was an effective answe r t o th e 
Soviet unwillingnes s t o infor m th e Czechoslova k side abou t w h o m th e Soviet author i -
ties ha d arrested . I n th e secon d hal f of 1946, th e first peopl e finally re turne d fro m th e 
Soviet U n i o n and , thank s t o th e informat io n the y provided , mor e precis e name s an d 
location s of th e camp s were available . 
6 Memorandu m of Conversatio n of Ambassado r Jiří Horá k from Marc h 26, 1946. AMFA , 
U.S.S.R . 1945-1959, box 37, folder 3. 
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Th e Czechoslova k governmen t struggled to analýze th e fragmentar y informatio n 
and to organiz e it systematically . O n April 19,1946, th e Foreig n Ministr y sent a secret 
analysis of th e known dat a on deporte d and interne d peopl e to th e Ministr y of Nation -
al Defense 7. Thi s repor t divided th e Czechoslova k Citizen s interne d in th e Soviet 
camp s int o two categories : prisoner s of war, and civilians who were arreste d in Czech -
oslovak territor y by th e Red Army or by the NKV D and deporte d to th e Soviet 
Union . These two major categorie s were broke n int o subcategorie s such as „person s 
considered , by th e Soviet authorities , to be prisoner s of war." Amon g the m were civil-
ians who had been deporte d by th e German s to Hungar y to labor on fortifications . 
Th e advancin g Red Army capture d man y of these individuals . 
Unfortunately , th e Czechoslova k positio n itself was weakene d as th e domesti c 
politica l tension s grew. Th e gradua l pressure from Czechoslova k Communists , 
supporte d by th e Soviet Union , influence d man y crucia l and politicall y sensitive ques-
tions , includin g th e agenda of repatriations . Vladimír Clementis , on e of th e to p 
Communis t leaders , appointe d from 1945 to 1948 as Stat e Secretar y to th e Foreig n 
Ministry , constantl y undermine d th e positio n of the Czechoslova k Ambassado r in 
Moscow . By 1947, th e Communis t influenc e in th e Foreig n Ministr y was obvious. 
Within th e Ministr y of Interior , th e Communis t positio n was even stronger . In th e 
Sprin g of 1947, th e Czechoslova k Foreig n Ministry' s officers in charge of th e agenda 
of repatriation s notice d th e first major signál tha t th e Czechoslovakia' s governmenta l 
repatriatio n philosoph y migh t have been challenged . In Marc h 1947, th e Ministr y of 
Interio r suddenl y claime d th e right to decid e whethe r negotiation s for repatriatio n of 
individual s shoul d commence . Th e Foreig n Ministry' s desk officers considere d th e 
deman d of th e Interio r "as no t very convenient , because it weakens ou r positio n in th e 
negotiation s with th e Soviets. Ou r stand which we hol d against th e Soviets is based on 
th e paragrap h numbe r seven of the treat y from Ma y 8, 1944"8. Th e Foreig n Ministr y 
finally stoppe d openl y arguin g with th e Interio r Ministry , so "tha t unnecessar y 
abstrac t debate s do no t postpon e even mor e th e retur n of th e interne d peopl e to th e 
hom e country , which would result in a loss of mora l values"9. 
Thi s first serious conflic t between th e Interio r and th e Foreig n Ministrie s in th e mat -
ter of repatriation s concentrate d thu s in th e debat ě on th e "statemen t on nationa l and 
politica l reliability". Th e Foreig n Ministry' s approac h was tha t "it is necessar y to 
interven e for every Czechoslova k citizen if the statemen t on nationa l and politica l 
reliability of tha t perso n issued by th e local nationa l committe e is include d in th e 
file"10. Th e purpos e of thi s statemen t was to confir m whethe r th e perso n had collabo -
rate d with th e Naz i regime or not . Th e result of thi s debat ě was a compromise , which 
was in fact a victory for th e Communists , since th e Ministr y of Interio r was authorize d 
to approv e preliminar y lists of person s on whose behalf th e Foreig n Ministr y would 
intervene . 
7 Secret urgent informatio n of the Czechoslova k Ministr y of Foreign Affairs for the Ministr y 
of Nationa l Defense from April 19,1946. AMFA, U.S.S.R . 1945-1959, box 37, folder4. 
8 Memorandu m for the State Secretar y Vladimir Clementi s from Marc h 18, 1947. AMFA, 
U.S.S.R. , 1945-1959, box 38, folder 6. 
9 Ibidem . 
10 Ibidem . 
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Man y of th e deporte d people , in particula r in Slovakia, had been , mor e or less, 
workin g for th e governmen t of th e Slovák State , or were member s of th e Hlink a 
Guard s durin g World War II . O n th e othe r hand , man y victims of deportation s were 
politicall y indifferen t people . Th e resistanc e fighters against Fascism , even Jewish sur-
vivors of th e Holocaus t who just returne d from th e concentratio n camp s were arreste d 
by th e NKV D and deporte d to th e Soviet Union . 
Man y peopl e were deporte d as victims of neighborhoo d jealousies and grudges after 
being pointe d ou t to th e Soviets as supporter s of Naz i policy. Th e Czechoslova k For -
eign Ministr y continue d to repea t at every occasio n tha t th e potentia l guilt of de-
porte d peopl e mus t be investigated and judged by Czechoslova k courts , and tha t 
therefor e even th e alleged Naz i collaborator s mus t be repatriated . 
Durin g th e first month s of 1947, th e repatriatio n progra m finally moved forward . 
Th e Soviet Governmenť s Representativ e for th e Repatriations , Genera l Golubiev , 
agreed tha t th e repatriatio n would be carrie d ou t in th e Luisdor f cam p (nea r Odessa) . 
Th e repatriatio n had to be observed by an officer of th e CzechoslovakEmbassy . Usuall y 
it was the secon d secretary , Emi l Schulz , who neede d to ask month s in advanc e at th e 
Soviet Foreig n Ministr y for permissio n to visit th e camp . Thi s example illustrate s ho w 
th e Soviet bureaucrac y slowed and complicate d th e retur n of deporte d civilians. Th e 
policie s of influentia l Czechoslova k authorities , for example thos e of th e Ministr y of 
Interior , played int o th e Soviet hands . Th e Czechoslova k Ministr y of Interio r re-
quire d tha t an extra step should be included : a final approva l issued by th e Ministr y of 
Interio r in Pragu e to each candidat e for repatriation . Thi s mean t tha t an extra step was 
unavoidabl e after all th e paperwor k was completed . Th e Czechoslova k Foreig n Mini -
stry struggled to avoid thi s requiremen t and argued tha t it would be an unnecessar y 
duplicatio n of proceduře . Finally , th e Ministr y of Foreig n Affairs and th e Ministr y of 
Interio r conclude d a compromis e Solution . The y agreed tha t a permissio n from th e 
Ministr y of Interio r would be require d just in "dubiou s cases, as for example in th e 
case of a person no t speakin g Czec h or Slovák . . . " n . Fro m this cam p in Odessa , th e 
repatriate s were transporte d by train to th e statio n at Co p on th e Czechoslovak-Sovie t 
border , where the y were released int o th e hand s of Czechoslova k authorities . Th e 
othe r rout ě was throug h th e cam p in Sighet , Rumania . Th e majorit y of repatriation s 
was complete d between th e fall of 1946 and fall 1947. 
Th e Communist s in th e Ministr y of th e Interio r applied constan t pressure on th e 
desk officers of th e Foreig n Ministr y to mak e th e repatriatio n as selective as Mosco w 
wanted . Th e Czechoslova k diplomat s were in a very difficult position , since th e Czech -
oslovak side was far from unite d and undoubtedl y undermine d by th e Communists . 
Th e conflict s between th e Foreig n Ministr y and th e Ministr y of Interio r reache d a cli-
max later in 1947. O n Novembe r 21, 1947, a major interministeria l meetin g was held 
in th e Foreig n Ministr y in Prague 1 2. Officials responsibl e for repatriatio n me t in th e 
Černi n Palác e to discuss th e repatriatio n from th e Soviet Union . Thi s meetin g was 
critica l due to th e basic differenc e in th e approache s of th e Foreig n Ministr y and th e 
" Ib idem . 
12 Minute s from the meeting , AMFA, U.S.S.R. , 1945-1959, box 38, folder 7, filé numbe r 
240.893-1-1 . 
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Ministrie s of Interio r and Defense . Th e participant s include d th e chief of th e Foreig n 
Ministry' s Fifth Department , which was in charge of repatriation s from th e Soviet 
Union , Dr . O . Pára , and desk officers Dr . Jan Dank o and Dr . Bartoň . Minister -
Counsello r Kašpáre k represente d th e Czechoslova k Embass y in Mosco w and contri -
bute d his experienc e with negotiatin g th e repatriatio n and intervenin g for Czechoslo -
vak Citizen s at th e Soviet Foreig n Ministry . Th e Ministr y of Interio r was represente d 
by th e chiefs of th e departments , Dr . Skořep a and Dr . Chudoba , and by thre e lower 
rankin g officers. Th e Ministr y of Nationa l Defens e was represente d by Lieutenant -
Colone l Gráf , th e Ministr y of Social Weifare representativ e was Dr . Satava. 
After a dramati c debatě , th e representative s of th e Ministrie s of Nationa l Defens e 
and Interio r pushe d throug h a progra m in suppor t of th e Soviet attitud e on th e re-
patriations . Th e unconditiona l retur n of all Czechoslova k civilians deporte d in th e 
Soviet Union , supporte d by th e Foreig n Ministry , was rejected . Th e argument s of th e 
Foreig n Ministr y tha t 900 person s ou t of 1,500 had alread y returned , and th e proces s 
of repatriatio n which finally starte d to be productiv e would be slowed down if th e 
change s were implemented , did no t succeed . Th e selective approac h won . Th e Interio r 
representative s presente d th e selective repatriatio n as a matte r of nationa l security , and 
assured participant s tha t the y had alread y approve d th e repatriatio n of 4,000 people . 
If the y were to be given th e authority , the y said, th e entir e proces s could be accelerate d 
and would last n o longer tha n on e month . After thi s meeting , th e Ministr y of Foreig n 
Affairs transferre d th e agenda of repatriation s from its politica l departmen t int o its 
administrativ e unit . Th e issue of repatriations , which was on th e to p of Ministry' s 
priorities , becam e no w "just a problé m of managemen t and transportation." 1 3 
Ther e were permanen t discrepancie s between th e numbe r of peopl e actuall y repa -
triate d and thos e suppose d to be repatriated . Th e Czechoslova k Embass y in Mosco w 
constantl y proteste d to th e Soviet Foreig n Ministr y because it was no t given thi s infor-
mation . In particular , ther e was a lack of dat a on transportatio n of interne d Czecho -
slovaks. Th e Soviets submitte d figures which did no t correspon d to what th e Czecho -
slovak borde r authoritie s recorded . Th e difference s were enormous , amountin g to 
thousand s of people . Th e highest rankin g Soviet officer responsibl e for th e repatria -
tion agenda , Genera l Golubiev , declare d on Jun e 11, 1948, tha t th e Soviet Unio n sent 
to Czechoslovaki a 91,560 people , 44,157 of whom were prisoner s of war and intern -
ed civilians14. I t was impossible for th e Czechoslova k authoritie s to verify thos e figu-
res. A differenc e of 32,000 peopl e was no t explained . Th e Czechoslovak s declare d tha t 
by th e end of 1948 th e Czechoslova k borde r authoritie s had checke d in a tota l of 
12,246 persons , includin g bot h prisoner s of war and internees . Accordin g to th e 
Czechoslova k data , 2,699 ou t of tha t numbe r were Slovaks, 2,318 were "reslovaki-
sants", e. g. Hungarian s who declare d an intentio n to chang e thei r nationalit y for a 
Slovák one ; 4,517 were Hungarians , 204 Germans , 58 Ruthenian s and 4 were classi-
fied as " other s ". At tha t tim e however , th e Soviets cam e f orward with anothe r numbe r 
of repatriate d Czechoslovaks : 55,517. Th e Czechoslova k Foreig n Ministr y was hesi-
Ib idem . 
AMFA, U.S.S.R . 1945-1959, box 39, folder 8. 
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tan t to accep t th e Soviet data . Fro m 1945 to Januar y 7, 1949, accordin g to th e Czech -
oslovak data , th e Soviets sent to Czechoslovaki a via th e railway statio n of Ciern a nad 
Tisou , 3,426 prisoner s and internees . Of these , 931 arrived by Septembe r 14,1948, and 
later , in seven transportations , anothe r 2,495 15. 
O n April 29,1949, th e Czechoslova k Embass y in Mosco w announce d tha t th e Soviet 
side had officially declare d th e completio n of repatriation s of prisoner s of war and 
interne d people . Therefore , th e Soviet authoritie s would no t accep t lists of prisoner s 
of war and internee s any longer 1 6. Th e Czechoslova k Foreig n Ministr y and Ministr y 
of Nationa l Defens e argued tha t "our consideratio n of th e repatriatio n as complete d 
would depen d on ho w man y prisoner s and interne d person s did no t retur n yet" 1 7 . Th e 
Soviets, however , considere d th e repatriatio n to be over, and tha t was decisive. Th e 
agenda of repatriation s drasticall y changed . Th e lists of peopl e to be repatriate d ceased 
to appear . When a repatriatio n was negotiated , it was always considere d as an indivi-
dua l and exceptiona l case. Th e hop e tha t th e Red Cros s coul d be ušed to continu e re-
patriation s failed. Th e Czechoslova k Red Cros s had a very bad experienc e with its 
Soviet counterpart , who demonstrate d a complet e lack of Cooperation . Th e Czecho -
slovak Red Cros s was in charge of th e search for person s overlooke d in th e Soviet 
Unio n in 1948. I t sent daily abou t 15-20 letter s to the Soviet Red Cross . However , in 
July 1949 th e Czechoslova k Red Cros s reporte d tha t no missing perso n was foun d 
whatsoever , n o case was complete d yet, and tha t for mor e tha n thre e month s no mai l 
had arrived from th e Soviet Re d Cross 1 8 . 
Upo n th e conclusio n of th e repatriation , two Czechoslova k diplomat s from th e 
embassy in Moscow , Vaško and Stefan , paid a visit to th e chief of th e Soviet Govern -
menť s Office for Repatriatio n Genera l Golubiev 1 9. Counselo r Vaško asked him for a 
final summary . Genera l Golubie v offered th e following Soviet data , which again dra -
stically differed from which Golubie v himsel f had claime d in June , 1948. Now , he 
said, th e tota l numbe r of repatriate d Czechoslovak s was 49,300 persons . Ou t of this 
number , 11,971 were prisoner s and interne d persons , 1,791 Hungaria n prisoner s of 
war, and 35,538 were "liberated persons" . Golubie v failed to precisely define thi s last 
category . Th e Czechoslova k diplomat s pointe d ou t th e obvious discrepancie s in th e 
Soviet data and Golubie v agreed to verify th e number s and presen t an official report . 
However , th e major poin t of th e conversatio n was for Golubie v somethin g eise: th e 
repatriatio n from Czechoslovaki a int o th e Soviet Union . 
Th e Soviets demande d tha t Czechoslovaki a was to deliver int o thei r hand s th e Rus-
sian or Ukrainia n national s who had lived in Czechoslovaki a since th e 1920s. Genera l 
Golubie v said it clearly: th e Cooperatio n of th e Czechoslova k governmen t in bringin g 
th e ethni c Russians , Ukrainian s and Belorussian s int o th e Soviet Unio n would be indi -
spensable . First , Czechoslovaki a shoul d submi t th e lists of th e Russian s and Ukrai -
nian s living in Czechoslovakia . Golubie v warne d tha t 
15 Informatio n of the Fifth Departmen t for the Ministe r of Foreign Affairs Vladimír Clementi s 
from Februar y 9, 1949. AMFA, U.S.S.R . 1945-1959, box 39, folder 2. 
16 Memorandu m from Decembe r 19,1949. AMFA, U.S.S.R . 1945-1959, box 39, folder 7. 
17 AMFA, U.S.S.R . 1945-1959, box 39, folder 2. 
18 AMFA, U.S.S.R . 1945-1959, box 38, folder 12. 
19 Ibidem . 
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the local institution s especially might have different persona l or othe r reasons includin g per-
haps the sentimenta l ones to be not sufficiently willing to cooperate , considerin g the known fact 
that the Czechoslovak s have a positive attitud e toward the Soviet people who found often in 
Czechoslovaki a their home , marrie d Czechoslova k women and have children . All of them will 
be summone d to be interviewed and the list of the people to be repatriate d will be set up. 
Golubie v stated tha t th e Soviet Unio n would conside r th e next Czechoslova k appli -
cation s for repatriatio n from th e Soviet Unio n accordin g to Czechoslova k Coopera -
tion in thi s matter . Th e Czechoslova k Ambassado r to th e Soviet Union , Bohusla v 
Laštovička (a Communis t appointe e who replace d Jiř í Horák) , recommende d tha t th e 
Ministr y of Interio r "instruc t in an adequat e way th e local authoritie s on Coopera -
tion with th e Soviet repatriatio n mission" . Du e to Communis t infiltration , it was no 
wonde r tha t th e Czechoslova k Ministr y of Interio r did th e utmos t to cooperat e with 
th e Soviets. In 1949, on e year after th e Communis t take-ove r in Czechoslovakia , 
when Stalin' s persona l cult had reache d its climax, th e Czechoslova k official reactio n 
hardl y could have been anythin g othe r tha n Cooperation . 
Ho w could the Czechoslova k governmen t permi t th e deportatio n of its Citizens ? 
Di d th e governmen t work effectively enoug h for th e retur n of its deporte d civilians ? 
Given th e militar y and politica l situations , th e Czechoslova k authoritie s probabl y 
could hardl y have prevente d th e deportatio n from happening . M y researc h document s 
show clearly tha t th e Red Army and th e NKV D unit s openl y violated th e Czechoslo -
vak-Sovie t treat y of Ma y 8, 1944. In man y cases th e Soviet element s blatantl y misused 
th e Czechoslova k local authoritie s when the y asked for temporar y labor to work on 
local route s or railroads . Often , th e peopl e who volunteere d to help th e liberator s 
were deporte d withou t reason . However , in man y cases th e Czech s and Slovaks report -
ed thei r own neighbor s as Naz i collaborators . M y stud y did no t focus on th e Naz i 
collaboratio n as a particula r phenomenon . M y positio n is tha t even in th e case of an 
individual' s suppor t of th e pro-Hitle r regime in Slovakia, th e Red Army and th e 
NKV D had n o right to depor t any Czechoslova k Citizen s to th e labor camps . Cze -
choslova k Citizen s were, as th e Czechoslovak-Sovie t treat y of Ma y 8, 1944 stated , 
unde r all circumstance s subject to Czechoslova k Jurisdiction . 
Th e Czechoslova k poin t of view requirin g th e unconditiona l retur n of all Czechoslo -
vak Citizen s was fully justified. However , th e gradua l incorporatio n of Czechoslovaki a 
in th e spher e of Soviet influenc e caused th e policy of some influentia l Czechoslova k 
institution s to change . Unti l then , th e Czechoslova k governmen t considere d bringin g 
th e deporte d civilians hom e as quickly as possible to be a priorit y and a mora l issue. 
All th e othe r questions , such as suspicion of an individual' s Cooperatio n with th e 
governmen t of th e Slovák Stat e durin g World War I I were to be solved by Czecho -
slovak insitution s after th e repatriation . Th e chang e in proceduř e tha t occurre d in 
th e middl e of 1947 mean t th e adoptio n of Stalinis t principles . 
Th e coerce d deportatio n of th e so-calle d "white emigration " was a particularl y tra -
gic case. These people , predominantl y of Russian , Ukrainia n or "Baltic" ethnicity , 
had lived in Czechoslovaki a for decades , mostl y since th e 1920s. The y were Czecho -
slovak Citizens . Man y of the m were arreste d and deporte d by th e Red Army and NKV D 
element s immediatel y after th e liberation . Other s were deporte d later , as a result of 
pressure from th e Soviet government . Ther e was no chanc e for thei r return . In 1945 
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and 1946, Czechoslovaki a frequentl y intervene d for thei r repatriation . Th e Soviets 
stubbornl y refused to negotiate , and declare d such negotiation s to be politicall y un -
suitable . After 1946, th e Czechoslova k intervention s ceased . 
Th e Situatio n of th e deportee s was bot h tragic and paradoxical . Because the y were 
civilians the y did no t have th e statu s of prisoner s of war, bu t the y actuall y were treate d 
by th e Soviets as prisoner s of war, even thoug h the y were Citizen s of a friendly 2 0 coun -
try. Onc e the y got int o th e Stalinis t machine , the y were a prior i and automaticall y 
considere d as enemie s of th e Soviet statě and treate d as such . I thin k tha t on e reason 
for large scale deportation s of th e civilian populatio n was th e Soviet Union' s need for 
labor . 
Th e main reason for th e deportations , however , was geopolitics . Czechoslovaki a 
feil int o th e spher e of Soviet interest s and began to be treate d as a satellite . Th e poli-
tica l context , and in particula r th e class principl e hidde n behin d th e deportatio n of 
civilians, is obvious: amon g th e victims of deportatio n were in particula r th e Hun -
garians from Slovakia, Jews, ethni c Russian s and Ukrainian s from th e Czec h lands , 
judges, notaries , teachers , high schoo l teachers , railroa d statio n chiefs, policemen , 
medica l doctors , priests , pharmacists,veterinar y doctors , bookkeepers , shopkeepers , 
high schoo l students . Thos e were ethnic , politica l or occupationa l group s tha t th e 
Communist s considere d to be th e class enemie s or at least th e potentia l betrayer s of th e 
working-clas s interests . Man y peopl e living behin d th e Iro n Curtain , nourishe d only 
by th e Communis t interpretatio n of history , justified th e use of prisoner s of war for 
th e reconstructio n of th e Soviet economy . On e of th e commo n argument s was tha t 
prisoner s of war were soldiers of th e Wehrmach t and its allies -  th e Slovák and Hunga -
rian armie s - , and therefor e expropriatio n of thei r labor was correct . Th e deporte d 
civilians were officially considere d as collaborator s with th e Nazis , and thei r fates did 
no t usually inspire muc h sympath y amon g uninforme d people . Thi s topi č was taboo , 
and n o researc h or publicatio n abou t it was possible. Th e Communis t interpretatio n 
of th e liberatio n of Czechoslovaki a was oriente d exclusively on glorificatio n of th e 
Red Army. Communis t propaganda , literatuře , poetry , creative arts , cinematograph y 
and historiograph y depicte d for decade s a black and white pictur e of th e liberatio n of 
Czechoslovakia , and nothin g coul d have been allowed to damag e th e glorious illusion 
abou t th e liberators . 
Th e Soviet Unio n kept th e alleged prisoner s of war after th e deadlin e for release of 
all prisoner s of war expired in 1948. Th e Soviets have always denie d thi s fact, Th e 
Soviet Unio n has been openl y criticize d for thi s policy. On e of th e main platform s for 
The Soviet Unio n did recognize the Slovák State which was established on Marc h 14, 1939. 
In July 1941, this recognitio n was withdrawn by the Soviet Unio n which recognize d the 
Czechoslova k Governmen t in exile in London . The Allied repudiation , in the summe r of 1941, 
of the Munic h agreement , established the politica l and legal continuit y of the First Republi c 
and Beneš' presidency . On Decembe r 12, 1943, the Treat y on Friendship , Mutua l Assistance 
and Postwar Cooperatio n was signed between the Czechoslova k and Soviet Governments . 
On May 8, 1944, an agreemen t was signed which stipulate d tha t the Czechoslova k territor y 
liberated by the Soviets would be placed unde r Czechoslova k civilian control , to which refer-
rence has been made at the beginnin g of this article . 
M.Polišenská,  The Deportation of Czechoslovak Citizens 381 
th e criticism was th e Unite d Nation s Genera l Assembly2 ' . Of course , any criticism 
was rejected by th e Soviet Unio n as imperialis t propaganda , and th e Soviet satellites 
includin g Czechoslovaki a always stood at th e Soviet side. Onl y unde r Presiden t Mik-
hail Gorbache v did th e Soviet Governmen t publicly admi t tha t POW s were kept in th e 
Soviet Unio n muc h longer tha n th e internationa l agreement s allowed. However , the 
perestroik a and glasnost leader s refused to admi t tha t civilians from foreign countrie s 
were interne d in th e camps . Th e Situatio n change d only after the collapse of Commu -
nism : in th e countrie s of th e Soviet bloc , topic s relate d to th e Soviet Unio n ceased to 
be taboo , and Soviet archives were finally mad e accessible to historica l researchers . 
AU the Germa n PO W had to be repatriate d by the end of 1948, but the Soviet Unio n did not 
respect this deadline . In 1950, the Government s of the Unite d States, Grea t Britain , Franc e 
and Australia stated at the Genera l Assembly of the Unite d Nation s that the Soviet Unio n did 
not  respect the conclusion s of the Genev a and Hague Convention s on Prisoner s of War and 
interne d persons . In the samé year, Chancello r Konra d Adenaue r officially asked the Soviet 
Unio n to inform him about the fate of more than one-millio n Germa n POWs who were still 
missing. In May 1950, the Government s of the Unite d States, Grea t Britain and Franc e sub-
mitte d to the Soviet Unio n a not ě asking for the establishmen t of an internationa l Institutio n 
for the investigation of POWs in the Soviet Unio n and at the samé time mentione d the intern -
ed civilian person s who had been deporte d from their home countries . 
